Saturday, 29 October 2022

Unexpectedly, SIA is redeeming the 2020 MCBs early!

Readers of my posts would know my opinion that the MCBs were a significant liability for SIA minority shareholders, because conversion in 2030/2031 would result in massive dilution of SIA stock. I had also expressed deep scepticism that SIA would be able to redeem the MCBs early (i.e. avoid a conversion event) and was surprised at how bullish DBS equity analysts were when they released a research report on SIA in May 2022.

Well, turns out that I am very likely to be wrong. SIA announced on 25 Oct 2022 that it would redeem the MCBs issued in 2020, to the tune of $3.86b. [BT link] The 2020 tranche was issued at $3.5b. There's also talk that SIA would likely redeem the 2021 tranche (issued at $6.2b), earlier than the 2031 conversion date - doing so would mean that the 2030/2031 dilution event is averted, and there is also potential for SIA to resume paying dividends to shareholders.

Some reflections on why my prediction was off:

1) I was focused primarily on net income. I estimated that SIA wouldn't be able to generate a cumulative $10b of profits by end of FY2030/31.

2) In doing so, I failed to consider the important fact that SIA had built up a sizeable warchest of cash and equivalents, arising from the various cash-raising exercises that it executed in 2020 and 2021. To put this in perspective, SIA had around $16b in cash and bank balances as at 30 June 2022. Pre-Covid, it looks as though the Group had around $3b in the same, although I am not sure if this is directly comparable as SIA appears to have changed its financial report format beginning in FY2020/21.

So in focusing my analysis just on net income alone, I didn't pay heed to the possibility that SIA could pay off the MCBs from its much-enlarged cash assets. Net of the $3.86b required for the committed redemption of the 2020 MCBs, SIA would still have around $12b in cash and equivalents.

With a boost in air travel from travel resumption helping to prop up SIA's quarterly profit, it now looks quite likely that SIA will be able to redeem the 2021 MCB tranches (around ~$7b including accrued interest) soon. This might happen sometime in 2H 2023 or possibly 1Q 2024.

Sunday, 24 July 2022

Why I've switched to using CPF OA to pay for my property loan

Previously, I was paying the monthly mortgage on my housing loan using cash. With the change in the interest rate environment, doing so no longer makes sense, and here's why I'll be switching to CPF OA to make the monthly payment going forward.

Saturday, 16 July 2022

Exploring SGS T-bills

The recent hike in global interest rates led me to become interested in a type of financial instrument that I had never previously explored in-depth: Singapore Government Securities (SGS) T-bills.

If you are like me and largely unfamiliar with T-bills, you can either refer to MAS's informative site for individual investors [link], or refer to my summary:

  • $1000 minimum investment amount
  • Tenure of 1-year, 6-months, or 3-months
  • Issued at discount to par
  • Yield determined via auction. Competitive bids determine the cut-off yield, non-competitive bids  take the cut-off yield 
  • AAA-rated

For the most recent issue of 6M T-bills (issue date 12 July 2022), the yield was 2.66% p.a. This makes T-bills a very compelling alternative to Fixed Deposits (FDs) that are issued by banks. In fact, the yield is much higher than the banks' FD rates (for 6M, smallest amount) as of time of writing, which are:

  • DBS: 0.75% p.a.
  • OCBC: 0.10% p.a.
  • UOB: 0.05% p.a.
  • (* Seeing how there is a 70 bp difference just between DBS and UOB, I would take these 'published' rates with a large pinch of salt. Note that there are often 'promotional' FD rates with certain conditions, e.g. UOB is offering 1.4% p.a. for 10M FD with minimum amount of $20k)

The latest 6M and 1Y T-bills are open for application from 14 July 2022. Their respective auctions will take place on 21 July 2022, and the T-bills will be issued on 26 July 2022. This is my first time applying for T-bills, and I plan to:

  • Apply for some 6M T-bills via non-competitive bid. If allotted, I will get whatever cut-off yield that is determined through the auction. Given interest rate trends, I expect this to be equal to or better than 2.66% p.a. Based on the results of the most recent issuance, 100% of non-competitive bids received an allotment, and I expect a similar high rate of allotment for non-competitive bids this time round. 
  • Apply for some 1Y T-bills via competitive bid. I will only receive an allotment if the cut-off yield (determined via auction) is equal to or better than my bid yield. For example, if I bid 3.25% but the cut-off is 3.05%, I will receive zero T-bills. The allotment rate for competitive bids is not as high as that for non-competitive bids, so I may end up with a partial allotment even if the first condition is met. I have not yet decided what I will bid, but I'll likely aim for something in the region of 3% p.a. or higher. [edit: Closely watching the YTMs of past issues of SGS Bonds, especially the one expiring in July 2023. At time of writing, the MAS SGS Bond Calculator indicates around 2.79% p.a. YTM so that should roughly correspond to the cut-off yield for the upcoming 1Y T-bill issue.]

How are T-bills different compared to Singapore Savings Bonds (SSB)

SSBs are probably slightly better understood among the general Singapore population. Every month, a new tranche of SSBs is issued, with a schedule of rates for the next 10 years. Key differences:

  • Tenure: SSBs have flexible tenure, in that the holder can sell them at any time within the 10 year period, and receive pro-rated interest up to the point of sale. In comparison, T-bills are more like  fixed deposits.
  • How the holder attains yield: SSBs distributes interest in the form of coupon payments every 6 months to SSB holders. T-bills are issued at discount to par, so the T-bill holder only realizes the yield at the end of the tenure period.
  • Allotment: For recent issues of SSBs, there has been oversubscription and hence many receive partial allotments only. For T-bills, it appears that non-competitive bids have a fairly high chance of full allotment, based on recent trends.

The oversubscription for SSBs has become a something of a problem - if you actually want to buy $50k of SSBs, but end up only getting a $20k allotment, you then have to figure out what to do with the remaining $30k. If you let it sit in the bank, it gets eroded by inflation.

Hence I am keen to try out a non-competitive bid for the 6M T-bill, essentially guaranteeing full allotment (but I do not have a direct say in the yield), whereas for the 1Y T-bill, I'm considering a competitive bid since I would prefer that it clears the 3% hurdle. [edit: See edit above; unlikely to surpass 3% p.a.]

Tuesday, 28 June 2022

The Unique Way CPF Computes Interest: Find out when is the best time to make a CPF Investment

Back in 2018, I learned that CPF computes its interest using a method different from that of typical bank accounts, and shared this information as a footnote to a post then. In a nutshell:

  • Bank account computes interest on a daily basis, and then pays you interest monthly (i.e. monthly compounding).
  • CPF computes interest on a monthly basis, and then pays you interest annual (i.e. annual compounding).
  • For the exact same amount, you will get slightly more interest when using monthly compounding as compared to annual compounding.

The CPF Board also explains this in layperson-friendly language on its website:

Source: CPF website, retrieved 28 June 2022.

Based on this, I have been under the impression that the monthly interest is computed in this manner:

A post I came across at Fatty's Finance also interprets likewise:  

via Fatty's Finance

Interest is calculated on the "lowest amount in the month" - sounds correct, and matches with the wording from the CPF website, at least from a layperson's reading of the latter.

After doing my own checks, I believe that this interpretation, as well as my diagram above, is not precisely correct.

Wednesday, 18 May 2022

Unpacking DBS research analysts' bullish view on SIA

(Initially, I had planned to spend some time jotting down some thoughts about how cooling measures, specifically ABSD, might have the unintended consequence of actually increasing property prices, but I shall KIV that for a later post.)

Given the assessments I had made about SIA in prior posts here, I had made a mental note to keep an eye on SIA's FY21/22 financial results, which are due to be announced tomorrow, 18 May 2022. Late this evening, I came across Business Times coverage (link, paywalled) of an analyst report (pdf link) by DBS research, giving a BUY call on the airline. I was intrigued for two reasons:

  1. Timing: By no means I track research reports regularly. However, it is uncommon for research reports to be published by analysts one day before a company's FY earnings announcement. Typically, analysts try to take into consideration the latest guidance/outlook as well as financial figures, so it struck me as very odd that the DBS equity research team decided to squeeze out its company update for SIA a day prior to the airline's earnings announcement. 

  2. Thesis: Readers of my previous posts would be aware of my view that the MCBs loom over SIA minority shareholders and present a significant dilution threat. In addition to being extremely bullish on SIA, DBS research also states that they "treat the MCBs as debt instead of equity, as [they] see SIA redeeming the MCBs within 10 years, and deduct the accrued interest at end-FY23/24F." This runs entirely counter to my views and made me wonder if I was missing something. 

I felt a need to jot down my thoughts in response. Here goes:

Strange Risk Assessment by DBS Analysts

The analyst report is exceptionally bullish - with "street-high earnings estimates" and valuation based on a P/BV that's 1.5 std devs above the stock's 10-year mean P/BV. I have no qualms with these, since that is their view. But look at the following paragraph (extracted from p1):

Huh, how can this be a risk? Are the DBS analysts saying that the risk to their (bullish) view is that they might not be bullish enough? Cos that's what the paragraph says. Pretty darn weird. One would expect an assessment of risks to be something like: "recession may dampen travel demand" or "new Covid variants may lead to dialling back of reopening" or "airline runs into manpower issues and unable to hire and re-train quickly enough", but no, we have the above paragraph that presents a strange, almost absurd assessment of the risks of the report team's stated view. 

Unclear how redemption of MCBs can be funded

Granted, any redemption is likely to occur closer to the conversion date of the MCBs, i.e. around 2030/2031, and this is beyond the time-frame of the report. Still, based on the analysts' FY2022/23 and FY2023/24 forecasts (net profit estimated to be $500 mil and $1 bil respectively), I believe that SIA won't be able to generate the $10 bil necessary to redeem the MCBs early, at least not from accumulated earnings between now and 2030/2031.

SIA minority shareholders should be aware that SIA is carrying the $9.7 bil of MCBs on its balance sheet as equity rather than as debt - see 1H-FY21/22 update, p4 of 37. Key implications of doing so:

  • By accounting for the MCBs as equity, SIA presents more favourable ratios and financials, such as lower Debt/Assets, Debt/Equity, etc. This is likely advantageous for SIA when it seeks to raise capital, e.g. taking on more debt.  
  • By accounting for the MCBs as equity, SIA ought to present key statistics, such as EPS and NAV per share, on basic as well as adjusted basis. [adjusted = assuming MCBs ultimately get converted to shares] Interestingly, SIA did not do so for the 1H-FY21/22 update (see p32) but subsequently reported both basic and adjusted figures in the 3Q-FY21/22 update (see p8 of 10). NAV per share at end-Dec 2021 was $7.45, while just $3.35 on the adjusted basis. The latter makes clear the immense dilutive effect on NAV if the MCBs were held till their mandatory conversion date. 

Notably, DBS analysts treat the MCBs as debt instead of equity, in line with their assumption that the MCBs will be redeemed rather than converted. SIA minority shareholders should pay close attention to valuations and forecasts. From what I can tell (see balance sheet on p8 of analyst report), the DBS analysts adopt SIA's accounting of the MCBs, i.e. carried on balance sheet as equity, even though they say that they treat the MCBs as debt instead of equity. 

I'll give the analysts benefit of doubt that this wasn't an oversight, after all, the redemption (if it happens) is almost certainly to be beyond 2024F. Shareholders should just bear in mind that, regardless whether carried as equity or debt, if the MCBs are to be redeemed prior to the mandatory conversion date, the cardinal accounting equation [Assets = Debt + Shareholders' Equity] still applies. So to wipe the $9.7b of Equity off the balance sheet, SIA will either need to wipe $9.7b off the Assets side of the equation, or pile on $9.7b more in Debt (or a mix of both). The DBS analysts have not shared any views as to how the MCBs will be redeemed, and it is my view that SIA will face a Herculean task in finding a lender willing to extend close to $10b of Debt to the airline for this purpose.

Dividends?? Really?!

The DBS analysts assume that SIA will resume paying a dividend as early as 2023F, with 5.06 cents DPS in 2023F and 10.8 cents DPS in 2024F. (see Forecasts and Valuation table on p1 of analyst report. Separately, note that on p8, the $150 mil expenditure in 2024F for dividends paid would refer to the 5.06 cents DPS paid on ~3 billion issued shares for the prior period 2023F)

I cannot agree with this assessment that dividend payouts will resume, since I believe it would be in SIA's interest to conserve cash if it intends to redeem the MCBs early. Resuming dividends payout simply does not gel with the analysts' view that SIA will redeem the MCBs early. 

===

Overall, I find the DBS research report almost laughably bullish. Of course, DBS and SIA are both under the big T umbrella and in fact have the same Chairman of their respective Boards, so perhaps there's much that I don't know. In any case, it seems that the DBS analysts are more bearish than me for the current FY, estimating an operating loss of $516 mil, as compared to my own latest revised estimate of operating loss between $350-$400 mil. We'll find out tomorrow when SIA releases its full-year results.

In the meantime, I can only hope that SIA minority shareholders are paying close attention to the actual numbers, and not just let themselves be buoyed by bullish media coverage.

===

UPDATE: 19/5/2022

Singapore Airlines released their full-year FY2021/22 earnings yesterday. Actual net loss of $962 mil compared to DBS analyst estimate of $811 mil (loss). Operating loss of $610 mil was greater than DBS analyst estimates of $516 mil as well as my own revised estimates above.

Not surprisingly, the stock price today gave up pretty much all of the boost that the bullish DBS report provided just a day before, as seen annotated below. The timing (and slant) of the analyst report is questionable.

Saturday, 2 April 2022

Resumption of travel: What beckons for Singapore Airlines?

[Disclosure: As at time of writing, I do not currently hold any position in SIA, and have no intention to establish a position in the same. I do, however, hold a position in SIA Engineering Company (SIAEC), which is a majority-owned subsidiary of SIA.]

With Singapore announcing reopening of borders with minimal restrictions for vaccinated travellers starting 31 Mar 2022, things are finally looking meaningfully better for travel, including air travel and SIA.

An article in ST on 1 April 2022 discussing SIA, SIAEC and SATS [link; subscription required] compelled me to dust off my thinking cap/analytical lenses, to revisit my previous views regarding holding SIA stock. I last wrote about SIA in May 2021 [link], building on two earlier posts from May 2020 [1] [2].

Saturday, 5 February 2022

Rocky Start to 2022

Although 2021 was set to look like a continuation of the positive momentum of 2020 that was driven largely by tech stocks, volatility that emerged around December 2021 and continued through January 2022 has eroded a significant amount of those gains.

I am reminded of my end-2018 post, where I reflected on that year and remarked about how I had ended up pretty much where I had begun. A few years on, with a few clicks on Interactive Broker's fantastic PortfolioAnalyst tool, I was able to generate a couple of reports that contained interesting and informative findings on my holdings under IB.*See footnote.

The risk measures section in the report is something I've paid scant attention to. The entire notion didn't even exist back when I was still using the platforms offered by other brokers in Singapore, because those platforms simply didn't let investors generate any sort of meaningful reports beyond the typical monthly account statement. I'm guessing there will probably be some geek who is still with one of those brokers and has taken it upon him/herself to track their investments separately in some spreadsheet in order to compute these statistics, but I neither have the time nor energy to do so. (In any case, IB offers lower fees than the majority of its competitors, and the competitors' platforms are crappier. So it doesn't really make sense to stick with those competitors, although it appears that a lot of people do, whether due to inertia or simple irrationality, I do not know. Disclaimer: I do have SGX holdings with SCB online trading, so I am occasionally compelled to endure using their platform, but I've been actively seeking alternatives.)

Anyway I digress. IB provided me the risk analysis for 2018:
(to decode: VT is Vanguard Total World; EWS is iShares MSCI Singapore ETF, which I use as an inaccurate proxy for STI; SPX is the S&P 500; and Robust is the alias of my portfolio with IB.)

Risk Measures for 2018

A few more clicks and I got the comparable data for 2020:

Risk Measures for 2020

And finally, I generated the same metrics for the time period since I setup my IB account and started using it, until the most recently available date (3 Feb 2022):

Risk Measures since Inception till Feb 2022

Some observations:

  • In 2018, Robust's Max Drawdown was 23.04%. This is almost comparable to the ongoing  decline associated with the recent market volatility: we're looking at Max Drawdown of 22.45% from Robust's peak in early Nov 2021 until its recent trough on 27 Jan 2022. And there's no indication that we are at the market bottom, so there may be more pain in the coming weeks or months. 
  • Consider this: Robust's Max Drawdown in 2020 was 30.12% - this was at the onset of Covid outbreak all around the world. If the current bearish market sentiment can't be shaken off, then Robust might approach a drawdown magnitude close to that of the onset of Covid - certainly a worrying thought, but more importantly it's a useful statistic that helps to put things in perspective.
  • In terms of Sharpe and Sortino ratios, Robust has outperformed both VT and SPX indices. (Although the EWS index is shown, it isn't a fair comparison since I believe EWS distributes rather than accumulates dividends, and so would be undervalued in all the charts and measures. #See footnote) 2020 was a stellar year with Sharpe ratio above 1, although overall the Sharpe Ratio for Robust since inception remains below 1, at 0.88. I hope to improve this over time. [Sidenote: In calculating downside deviation and Sortino Ratios, IB uses the historical annual return of the S&P 500 since inception, including dividends. This is why the Sortino Ratio for SPX is close to 1 for the Aug 2017-Feb 2022 period.]
  • Mean Return for Robust for the full time period is 0.08% daily. This means that if I had $1 million (I don't) in Robust, it would theoretically have generated an average return of $800 every day for the time period. This is a thought experiment more than anything, since there are periods where the portfolio as a whole has declined by 20% or more (see first and second bullet points) but its quite a provoking finding nonetheless.
  • Comparing the drawdowns and subsequent recoveries in 2020, the tech-heavy weightage of Robust is evident from its relatively quick recovery of 57 days, compared to the slower recovers of the more diversified indices of SPX (106 days) and VT (110 days). This was because tech stocks benefited immensely from remote working and other Covid restrictions. For the current drawdown, I do not expect Robust to outpace SPX and/or VT in recovery, because the tables have been turned and it is precisely the sector to which Robust is overweight (tech) that has led the recent declines.

*It is truly a travesty that the incumbent brokers in Singapore offer investors no way to generate such reports. This is due to one of two main reasons: 1) the use of individual CDP accounts means that a broker cannot have an accurate picture of its client's holdings at any particular point in time - and by extension, over any particular time period - and hence cannot track returns nor risk measures of a client's portfolio; 2) there is generally a lack of cutting-edge features in investment platforms offered by the incumbents in SG, and most appear comfortable to hobble along with idiosyncratic, feature-thin, and perplexing client-facing products.

# Some info is available on the iShares website https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239678/ishares-msci-singapore-capped-etf#chartDialog that allows for comparison. Using the Aug 2017 to Feb 2022 time period, $10,000 in EWS, with distributions reinvested, would have ended up at $10,492.70. Strangely, the IB captures the EWS return for the same time period as 5.04%, i.e. $10,000 would have ended up at $10,504. Perhaps I'm mistaken, and EWS data reflected in IB reports assumes that distributions are reinvested rather than paid out. But the tl;dr remains the same, performance of Singapore-listed equities has been rather paltry in the last 5 years. Using the iShares site and extending the time horizon to 10 years, the annualised returns for EWS works out to be around 2.3% - notably, this is lousier than returns offered under the CPF Ordinary Account!

Thursday, 9 September 2021

A Reflection

 As I approach a significant milestone in my life - the first time in more than 7 years where I will not be getting a salaried income - I thought it would be good to reflect, with the benefit of hindsight, on how I would have approached a couple of key financial decisions.

As with all posts, this is not meant to be treated as financial advice. Instead, some readers may find these perspectives helpful in approaching their own financial decisions.


#1 - Early CPF monies 

Even before I went to university, I had a small amount in my CPF account because I worked in a travel firm during the couple of months between completion of NS and the start of the freshman fall term. This would have been mainly in my CPF Ordinary Account (OA) because CPF allocation rates for young people are set up that way. 

On hindsight, I would have been better off if I have moved most of my OA monies to my Special Account (SA) back then. This would have let me tap on SA's 4+1% interest, which is higher than the OA's 2.5%. The drawback of such OA->SA transfers is that it is one-way, the funds will remain in the SA until I turn 55. This means that, upon such a transfer, I lose the flexibility to use this amount of OA for other purposes (typically housing) in the future. But the amount was pretty small, and honestly wouldn't have made much of a difference by the time I actually got around to a situation where I could potentially use my OA for housing. In that sense, leaving this early amount in the OA rather than transferring to the SA was foregoing potential interest.

To illustrate, assume $1000 left the OA, versus $1000 transferred to the SA. After 10 years, the total amounts including interest accrued would be around $1280 and $1629 respectively. This means that someone who did the OA->SA transfer is 27% better off after 10 years than someone else who did nothing and let the money remain in their OA. 


#2 - Voluntary Contribution to Medisave Account

Almost every Singaporean starting their first job in Singapore will likely experience the joy of receiving their first paycheck, only to have it slightly dampened by the realisation that a significant portion (20%) of their wage must be channeled to their CPF account. While this reduces the amount of disposable income, it actually presents an excellent opportunity to make savvy moves to maximise the longer-term returns from CPF, and the key is to start early.

I recall focusing mostly on the non-CPF part of my salary, i.e. the "cash", and being quite fixated on maximising the interest I could earn from high-yield savings accounts such as OCBC360 and later DBS Multiplier. There was a point in time when OCBC360 was paying 3.05% interest on balances of up to $50k or so, and because of all the hype and marketing, I was more focused on this and largely left my CPF monies as-is. On hindsight, I could have optimised my CPF returns by being more deliberate.

The CPF scheme is fairly complicated, and I don't think I want to cover too much of that here. There's a lot of material available online such as this DollarsAndSense post that readers may find helpful. I wasn't aware back then, but on hindsight I would have paid more attention to the amount in my Medisave Account (MA) and considered a voluntary top-up to this account (sometimes referred to as VCMA). The MA earns the same interest as the SA, i.e. 4% plus an extra 1% on the first $60k of combined OA/SA/MA balances.

In addition to providing income tax relief, the key benefit of topping up the MA is to be able to reach the MA ceiling, known as the Basic Healthcare Sum (BHS), as early as possible. The BHS stands at $63,000 as of 2021 and increases yearly. Upon attaining the BHS, any subsequent CPF contributions that are supposed to go into the MA would flow into the SA instead (assuming one's SA is below the prevailing Full Retirement Sum (FRS) which is almost certainly the case for anyone in the first few years of work). May help to think of it as follows - once the MA "bucket" is full, any overflow from the MA bucket ends up inside the SA bucket. With both the SA and the MA allocation now flowing into the SA, the speed at which the SA grows over time is accelerated, putting the individual on a quicker path to achieving the FRS.


#3 - Retirement Sum Topping Up Scheme or OA-to-SA transfer

The other voluntary contribution covered in the DollarsAndSense article is the Retirement Sum Topping Up Scheme, sometimes referred to as RSTU. If given the option, I would personally have done the VCMA first, then considered the RSTU, but to be frank either option is okay. Similar to VCMA, the RSTU also provides income tax relief, and involves putting cash into the CPF SA to benefit from the 4+1% interest. As I mentioned earlier, once the cash goes in the SA, it will remain there until age 55, so there are some drawbacks compared to having the flexibility of cash. But as the higher-yield savings accounts began to impose more stringent requirements and/or lower overall interest rates, I ought to have considered either VCMA or RSTU as an alternative to put away cash that I did not have a near-term need for. This would have been especially applicable to any cash that was not earning the higher interest rates (banks only gave higher interest on the first $50k-$70k, and a paltry interest beyond that). 

Another way to earn tap on the higher SA interest rate would be to make an OA-to-SA transfer, which I did. At that time, options to invest CPF monies were limited (Endowus - see this post - wasn't an option yet) and I wasn't keen to incur the various recurring fees charged by CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS) agent banks. And as shared earlier, allocation rates for young people skew heavily towards the OA, so I ended up with quite a lot of money in my OA and not a lot in my SA. In order to tap on the higher interest rate, I moved a portion of my OA to the SA (one-way transfer). On hindsight, I ought to have done this earlier, especially because for the extra 1% on the first $60k of combined OA/SA/MA balances, only up to $20k of the OA balance is eligible - see useful infographic from CPF. This means that I should have gunned for $40k in my combined SA/MA as early as possible. To illustrate more clearly, using three hypothetical persons all with $60k total CPF balance:

  • Person A: $45k in OA, $15k in SA+MA. Person A will earn 2.5+1% on first $20k of the $45k, in OA and 2.5% on the remaining $25k in OA, and 4+1% on the $15k. This is roughly $2075 per year in interest earned, or a blended interest rate of 3.458%.
  • Person B: $20k in OA, $40k in SA+MA. Person A will earn 2.5+1% on the $20k and 4+1% on the $40k. This is roughly $2700 per year in interest earned, or a blended interest rate of 4.5%.
  • Person C: $10k in OA, $50k in SA+MA. Person A will earn 2.5+1% on the $10k and 4+1% on the $50k. This is roughly $2850 per year in interest earned, or a blended interest rate of 4.75%.

I was sort of like person A for quite a while, before finally moving some OA to SA monies and becoming more like persons B/C. Later on, Endowus came into the picture, so now instead of transferring my OA to my SA, I would invest my OA into equities and let that grow over time. Even so, the OA-to-SA transfer remains lucrative because it offers 4% interest risk-free. Of course, if readers foresee needing to tap on OA for housing purchase, then they should plan accordingly, but otherwise as shared in #1, there is  sizeable interest foregone if CPF monies are left untouched in the OA for prolonged periods.


#4 - Set up SRS account

Preamble: the Supplementary Retirement Scheme (SRS) and CPF are two completely different things. If you are not clear, I suggest that you read up elsewhere so that you are clear and do not confuse the two. 

After working for a few years and building up an adequate emergency fund, it may be worth contributing to SRS to enjoy income tax relief. The catch? SRS funds can only be withdrawn when you reach the retirement age at the point that the SRS account is setup. So there's no reason not to set up the SRS first, put in $1, and lock in at the current retirement age (62 as of 2021). If you wait, then you lose the flexibility because eventually your SRS funds can only be withdrawn at an older retirement age. So just set up the SRS account with your preferred local bank as soon as possible.

The question of when to contribute to the SRS account (to enjoy income tax relief) is a more complex one, as it involves individual circumstances, i.e. one's income tax bracket and what one plans to do with the tax savings, so I won't cover it here

Wednesday, 19 May 2021

Triggering of the Additional MCBs

What does this mean for Singapore Airlines, which has just experienced its "toughest year in its history"?

I'm going light on the narration, because I think the numbers really speak for themselves. I've also shared my thoughts back last year in May 2020 [1] [2] about the 2020 rights issue.

Singapore Airlines pre-covid market cap in July 2019, when travel market was booming: $11.5 bil

Just before the 2020 rights issue, market cap of around $7 bil, on 1.185 billion shares outstanding.

After 2020 rights issue, increase to 2.963 billion shares outstanding. At a low of $3.20, this meant a market cap of around $9 bil. Based on today's closing share price of $4.70, market cap of around $13.9 bil. (Yes, more than pre-covid! But don't forget, SIA raised $5.3 bil cash from the rights issue alone)

If the 2020 MCBs are converted in 2030: 1.3 billion more shares (total 4.26 bil shares)

If the 2021 MCBs are converted in 2031: 2.3 billion more shares (total 6.56 bil shares)

If we assume in 2031 that SIA market cap reaches $20 bil + no early redemption of either tranches of MCB, we are looking at $3.05 per share.

If, on the other hand, we are think that SIA will be able to redeem the first ($3.5b) and second ($6.2b) tranches of MCB before maturity, we are looking at the airline somehow being able to raise a massive sum of money to redeem these bonds. We're talking in the range of $12.4b (if redeemed at the 5th year) to $16.5b (if redeemed at the 9th year).

The numbers well and truly speak for themselves.

Thursday, 15 April 2021

Pondering about ticker symbols

So the other day, I was wondering whether ticker symbols had any impact on stock price performance. Specifically, I was curious about whether tickers that came earlier in the alphabet (e.g. AAPL, AMZN) performed differently as compared to tickers further down the alphabet (e.g. TSLA, ZTS).

Impetus for the Idea

The thought struck me while I was looking at my portfolio via Interactive Brokers on my phone. Because of the limited screen size and the default alphabetical sort order of my positions, I observed that I tended to pay more attention to counters that were displayed upfront (those with tickers earlier in the alphabet) as compared to counters that required scrolling in order to be visible (those with tickers later in the alphabet).

Was it just a coincidence that FAANG stocks - Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google - all have tickers that fall within the first half of the 26-letter alphabet, with the sole exception of Netflix, which just tip overs into the 2nd half, with N at the 14th position? A quick look at the five largest public corporations in the world (by market capitalization) [Wikipedia] also showed that the top five, throughout 2020 as well as at 2021, were all of the early-alphabet category. Intrigued!

[factoid: at time of writing, I held only two positions with tickers in the 2nd half of the alphabet: QQQ and ZTS. The rest of my portfolio comprised tickers in the 1st half of the alphabet, i.e. A to M]

Tangential finding from an earlier study

I briefly googled to see if there was any past study done on this (didn't come across, so perhaps an area for novel research!) but instead I found an excerpt of a 2006 Princeton study that found correlation between popularity of a stock after IPO and the ease of pronouncing a company's name. In addition, the study drew similar conclusions about the company's ticker symbol, stating that "...all else being equal, a stock with the symbol BAL should outperform one with the symbol BDL in the first few days of trading."

Now, isn't that fascinating? 

While the study's findings were different from my initial question in two significant ways - (i) it focused on the ease of pronunciation, rather than the alphabetical order; and (ii) it only looked at stock performance right after IPO, whereas I was interested in longer-term performance - the fact that such an observation could be gleaned from real-world data makes me fairly convinced that there could be some sort of association between a stock ticker's alphabetical order, and perhaps either the stock's performance, or interest in the counter. (Interest not necessarily translating to positive returns.)

Basis for my hypothesis

One of the reasons I think such a relationship could exist is the recent emergence of DIY stock trading. As recently as two decades ago, would-be stock purchasers would typically go through a broker, making a phone call to instruct their (human) broker that they wanted to purchase XX shares in YY company at AA price. The would-be purchaser typically would not view any kind of alphabetically-sorted list, before making their instruction. (This is not to say that the would-be purchaser simply plucked their intention out of thin air; they would, in all likelihood, mull over the names - or perhaps tickers - of various companies, before determining that they would want to purchase YY company rather than say ZZ company. The point here is that the would-be purchasers is unlikely to have encountered an alphabetically-ordered list of any kind in the course of their evaluation.)

Today, the typical mode to conduct such a transaction would be via an online broker, either via a web browser, mobile app, or the like. Such platforms provide the added ability to easily view one's portfolio, e.g. through a dashboard. As with any kind of list, there needs to be a default sort order, and I venture that for almost all such brokerage platforms, the default sort order would be alphabetical ascending, placing tickers like AAPL and AMZN at the top, GOOG a bit further down, TSLA further down still... you get the idea. Humans have a natural tendency to cycle through a list from top to bottom, which leads me to believe that there is a possibly-unresearched question of whether ticker symbols correlate with attention paid to the stock, translating into potential interest, and potentially translating into outsized performance. (The point that potential interest may not translate into actual demand for the stock is not lost here, though in this era of meme stocks, I dare hazard that "interest" in a stock tends to translate into positive movements in the stock price.)

Possible angle for research

Acquiring the data required for analysis is probably not insurmountable, given how stock price information is widely available on the internet. The main challenge would be deciding how to measure the dependent variable, and how to control for the various possible interacting factors.

For instance, if we took, say, all 3000 listed companies in the Russell 3000 index, we would expect to find some heterogeneity in the frequency distribution of the leading alphabet of the ticker, for instance, more tickers starting with 'A' than tickers starting with 'V'. We can control for this by taking the average performance for all tickers starting the alphabet, although we may have few data points for certain starting alphabets. Depending on the exact nature of the question we are trying to answer, we could even aggregate our data (e.g. into two groups: Group 1 comprising tickers starting with alphabets A through M, and Group 2 comprising tickers starting N through Z.)

It would then be a matter of testing:

  • Null hypothesis: the stock price returns of Group 1 is same as the stock price returns of Group 2
  • Alternative hypothesis: the stock price returns of Group 1 is different from the stock price returns of Group 2
We would need to consider controlling for various factors, such as:
  • Market cap - if the pre-existing market cap of Group 1 is different from the pre-existing market cap of Group 2, and market cap has correlation with stock price returns, we could end up wrongly rejecting the null hypothesis (Type 1 Error).
  • Industry or sectoral concentration - similar to the above, if Group 1 had a higher concentration in fast-growing sectors (e.g. technology) while Group 2 had a higher proportion of slower-growing sectors, we could again commit a Type 1 Error unless this difference is adequately controlled for.
  • Ease of pronunciation - with the 2006 Princeton study finding that ease of pronunciation of company name and ticker symbol was positively correlated with purchases of the new stock following its IPO, we would have to find a way to negate any potential effect of Group 1 tickers being generally easier to pronounce than Group 2 tickers, in order to isolate just the effect of alphabetical ordering.

As you can tell, this analysis would not be a trivial exercise, but I feel that existing methods of quantitative research can be easily applied to study this topic and possible yield some interesting insights.

Closing thoughts - What's in a name?

Having posed this question and then regaled you with my idea of how this could potentially be studied, I'll end off with a slightly more pragmatic thought that circles backs to the Princeton study. Danny Oppenheimer, one of the Princeton co-authors, was quoted as saying that "These findings contribute to the notion that psychology has a great deal to contribute to economic theory."

This statement is effectively irrefutable - psychology surfaces in every aspect of human life, and explains how humans have certain biases, or how our perceptions sometimes depart from reality, etc. We probably still don't know how much influence psychology wields over human behaviour leading to economic consequences. Stemming from the observation that easily-pronounced tickers tend to outperform following the IPO, is there then also a possible relationship between the cognitive ease of associating a company's ticker symbol, with object of the company itself, typically represented cognitively by the company name?

On US exchanges, key companies often have ticker symbols that are easily-recognisable variants of the company name, e.g. Apple/AAPL, Tesla/TSLA, General Motors Company/GM, Advanced Micro Devices/AMD etc. This has evolved to become almost a cultural norm of sorts, and companies considering a listing depart from this unwritten rule at their own peril.

But this isn't a global convention. In Hong Kong, for example, listed companies have a numerical ticker (e.g. 9988 for Alibaba). In Singapore, tickers comprise mix of alphabets and numerical digits. At some level, the leading alphabet of the tickers seems to be derived from the company name (e.g. DBS Group/D05, Wing Tai Holdings/W05, UOL Group/U14), but then there are enough exceptions to make this mnemonic useless - Singapore Airlines/C6L, Hong Leong Finance/S41, to name a few. I put forward the notion that the ticker naming system in Singapore makes it more difficult for laypersons to easily recall company-ticker pairs than the US system. 

Could there actually be economic losses arising from the more-difficult-than-necessary association between company names and ticker symbols? Say DBS Group were listed as DBS instead of D05, Singapore Airlines as SQ instead of C6L, City Developments as CDL rather than C09, and Guocoland as GCL rather than F17. Would this have increased market participation and efficiency by lowering, perhaps just ever so slightly, the mental gymnastics required to figure out what is what? I mean, part of the reason why GameStop shot to meme fame was because people could easily input GME and satiate their curiosity on the latest ongoings, rather than having to guess whether it was G48 or F19 or A83. By removing just one additional hurdle, the human brain is freed up just enough to do one additional task - and that task could very well be making a stock purchase decision.

I'm going to put my money that Grab's upcoming listing via the Altimeter SPAC is almost certainly going to gun for the GRAB ticker symbol. The notion that Grab would prefer GB or G01 or GR413 or some other variant over GRAB is beyond absurd. We should then question whether absurd practices, perhaps due to legacy reasons, continue unabated on our very shores, and at what cost.

Friday, 1 January 2021

Rolling out of 2020

The year 2020 has been difficult for pretty much everyone, and most people would welcome 2021 with the hope of some relief and less tumult. This post is intended as a look back on 2020 from an investment perspective, and to list some broad plans for 2021.

SGD Portfolio in 2020

I was not very active on this front, with probably only a single-digit count of transactions for the whole year. The main buzz (see posts from May 2020) were on Singapore Airlines' rights issue, arising from my desire to thoroughly understand the offering in order to correct any misconceptions that my family members and friends may have had. I personally have only a very minor position in Singapore Airlines, so I wasn't massively impacted and in late November I took advantage of a sudden resurgence to trim my position at the favourable price of 4.65, realising some paper losses but deciding that the long-term prospects for the airline are still fairly gloomy.

I wish that I had been more ambitious in creating/adding to positions in Singapore banks (referring to DBS, OCBC, UOB) as there was a brief period where they were looking very undervalued and I was a little too hesitant to pull the trigger. 

Other than that, I begun to effect a regular contribution to my Endowus and Stashaway accounts, and will touch on that later.

USD Portfolio in 2020

Earlier this month, I was looking at the Nasdaq and realised that if I had simply purchased the index, I would be looking at over 40% gains for the year. Who would have known a year ago that tech counters would benefit so greatly from working-from-home, and that the market would continue its feverish ascent after a significant pullback in March?

As my own portfolio has a fairly heavy tech slant, I managed to finish the year with significant upside of around 32%, shy of the Nasdaq but ahead of major indices such as the S&P or the Vanguard Total World. Making use of the excellent custom reports feature of Interactive Brokers, I was also able to learn that my portfolio had a Sharpe return of above 1.1, which is decent.


 

As a long-only, unleveraged portfolio, this has been a year of good returns. That said, some of the gains were offset by weakening of USD against SGD, though I am not overly concerned in the near-term. 

The key drivers were semicon-related, with AMD, MU, and MRVL being big contributors to the positive return. AMD especially has made significant headway against Intel, but Apple threw its hat in the ring with their new M1 silicon which, from all accounts, appears to be a total game-changer. Given that TSMC is fabricating for both AMD and Apple, it feels like an attractive play, but I was unable to find a suitable price at which to enter a position.

I was fortunate to have very limited exposure to US airlines, although I watched with dismay as RLH (mentioned in my November 2019 post as a possible M&A prospect) sank from 3.60 at the start of the year to a low of 1.24 in March 2020. While luxury and business hotels (think Marriott, Hilton etc.) struggled, I felt that there was a case for the economy and mid-range segment due to the continued movement of personnel to temporary accommodation (e.g. medical workers who were being relocated to US states in dire need of more manpower). As RLH Corp (formerly Red Lion Hotels) was in that segment, I was prepared to hold on and even considered adding to my position. Admittedly, it was unnerving to see the price free-fall below 2.00, and even though a good recover was made in June 2020, the stock slowly slipped below again in October, before recovering again in the last two months of the year. As it turned out, my November 2019 post was not at all wrong, and an acquisition offer was just made at $3.50 per share by Sonesta on the second last day of the year. While the offer represents a healthy premium over the last-done price, I can't help but feel that it may have been too soon as I was hoping for a longer runway for recovery before a takeover offer was accepted. We'll see how the deal turns out (my hunch is that it will clear), and if it succeeds then this will be the first M&A I've called having previously exited too early on both Panera Bread and Sodastream. [I'm still mildly surprised that Square has not been acquired, though at current valuations I now see this as a very distant possibility. A crazy 200+% return in 2020 and I kick myself for having exited on that position.] 

What's ahead for 2021?

Having had minimal opportunity to spend money this year, I managed to save up a fair bit of extra cash. I intend to progressively funnel this into Endowus (sign up using my referral link) or Stashaway via monthly contributions, and am targeting to keep a much smaller amount of cash as emergency funds, being mindful that leaving too much cash in the bank at near-zero interest rates is a terrible idea. Endowus has been especially appealing because it offers a way to invest CPF funds, and because of this I no longer view CPF OA -> CPF SA one-way transfers as an attractive option for younger adults. To illustrate, the 1-year TWR of my Endowus CPF 100% equities portfolio was in the region of 9%, and this is pretty much where I hoped it would be. For those of us with a long investment horizon, CPF OA/SA returns of 2.5% or 4% may not be optimal depending on one's overall risk appetite and overall portfolio allocation.

SGD stocks continue to be quite unappealing for me, and I doubt this will change in 2021, especially since REITs - the only thing I would actively like to add to my portfolio at this time - continue to look expensive. I should also look at unwinding from some of the poor-performing counters (looking at you, SIAEC) and rotate this into Endowus or Stashaway, probably after trimming my low-yielding cash.

On the USD portfolio, I think 2020 has demonstrated that my current approach works well, and I will not deviate too much from the tech-heavy playbook. Am feeling good about Apple's latest M1-based products, in particular, and will also keep an eye out for other 5G players. I have never been very well-versed with the bio-tech/pharma sector and the upcoming year could be an opportunity to establish some positions on those. In terms of a post-vaccine recovery play, I am still not too confident for hotels, as I foresee leisure travel to still remain weak, but I think there could be a case for airlines.

Friday, 8 May 2020

Singapore Airlines: A potential excess rights play?

In my previous post, I shared on what are the steps required for SIA shareholders who are not intending to put thousands of dollars more into the beleaguered airline. Yes, I'm calling it for what it is, beleaguered.

Over here, I'm going to touch on a potential trading strategy that could benefit some holders who have extra cash on hand. Before I begin, I need to highlight that this strategy contains a fair degree of inherent risk, and readers should do your due diligence to assess whether the risk and outcomes associated with this strategy are suitable for their investment profile.

Thursday, 7 May 2020

Singapore Airlines Rights Shares and Rights MCBs

Many of us may own SIA shares, or probably knows someone who does. The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic has hit airlines around the world in a manner never seen before, and SIA has not been spared.

The recent rights issue is fairly complicated, and I want to outline the implications here. The key takeaway is that Doing Nothing Will Hurt You Greatly. Read on to find on why.


Sunday, 8 December 2019

Credit Card strategy for 2020

Spending money is inevitable. Part of achieving robust returns is making your spending work for you. There are many different credit cards in the market today, and Grab has just launched the GrabPay Card (a Mastercard tie-up). With so many payment options, I share my intended strategy for different types of transactions in 2020.

1) Groceries from Fairprice
The preferred mode here is to pay by Fairprice gift card (securing 7.3% cashback - see item 2) or by Citi SMRT card (up to 5% cashback for transactions >= $50, or up to 3% cashback for transactions <$50. A reduction of 0.3% if monthly retail spend is less than $300, hence the "up to".. yes Singapore credit cards are ridiculously complicated like that.)

2) Gift Cards from Fairprice
By using the Citi SMRT card at Kallang Wave Fairprice Xtra only, I get 7.3% cashback, assuming I top up $300 into the gift card each time I go to Kallang Wave (which I do not frequent), or whatever amount to meet the $300 monthly spend requirement for this card. Otherwise, it's 7%, which is alright, but the point is to go to Kallang Wave Mall as infrequently as I can.

3) Public Transport
Quoting from Citi's website: "2% SMRT$ (i.e. cashback) is awarded for EZ-Reload transactions of more than $30. 1% SMRT$ is awarded for EZ-Reload transactions of $30 or less. For monthly statement retail purchases of less than $300, SMRT$ earn rate will be 0.3% less.Citi SMRT card." Grief. Long story short, set EZ-Reload to $50 and earn 2% cashback.

4) Online spend
This one is tricky. It can either go to the Citi Rewards Visa (4 mpd up to $1000 per statement) or to the DBS Woman's World Mastercard - which men can apply for (4 mpd). There's a slightly different rounding policy, because DBS WWMC rounds down to the nearest $5, so my preference here is the CRV, assuming I haven't already maxed it out for item 5 below...

5) Any other place which accepts Mastercard (contactless)
Sometimes, I may need to buy something from Cold Storage or Sheng Shiong. Or Watsons or Guardian. Or any other retail shop. The new GrabPay Card is the winner here. Because I can top-up my GrabPay wallet using the CRV (4mpd up to $1000 per statement - this mechanism might not last...), I can effectively unlock 4mpd by using the GrabPay card at these physical merchants. If they accept Samsung Pay, then better still cos I can triple-dip - I get 4mpd + GrabRewards + Samsung Pay points. The catch? This probably doesn't work for big-ticket items, unless you plan to keep a few thousand dollars in your GrabPay wallet... (see item 6)

6) Any other place which accepts FavePay/GrabPay
Okay, so no credit card accepted... cash or NETS only? Meh. Oh, you take FavePay/GrabPay. Great - here, take my money and let me earn my 4mpd + GrabRewards + Fave Cashback.

7) Big-ticket items
Since GrabPay might not be possible (e.g. transaction limit for contactless?), the best solution is to sign up for a new credit card a few weeks prior. The Amex Rewards card (the white one) is a decent option with a good sign-up bonus for $1500 spend and a very reasonable $53.50 annual fee.

So one big category which I omit is travel. I typically use my US credit card for that purpose (no foreign txn fees, which is proving to be useful in light of the slow but steady upward creep of the same fee for SG credit cards).

The GrabPay card slots itself usefully into a gap in an already-crowded market. There's supposed to be a physical card (numberless!) in the works and that could help to deal with situations where the transaction is higher than the contactless limit, or if the merchant lacks a contactless reader.

What do you think of this strategy? Feel free to share yours in the comments below!

Thursday, 28 November 2019

Endowus - New option for investing CPF monies

I recently attended an outreach session by Endowus, a relatively new investing platform. It offers an interesting additional option for investing CPF monies (they also do cash portfolios, but this post will focus primarily on CPF) for Singaporeans, and I think it's worth considering.

If you are keen to sign up for an account with Endowus, do consider using my referral link which enables both of us to have $10,000 of funds advised free for 6 months (a $20 value, to be precise). I receive no compensation from Endowus or any other party in writing this post.


Investing CPF - why even?


I shed some light on my revised views of the CPF in an earlier post, including my re-think of the CPF Ordinary Account (OA) as a quasi-cash "Housing Account" while the Special Account (SA) functions as the primary retirement vehicle. One of the questions I raised was whether 2.5% (the current OA interest rate) is a reasonable rate of return for the long term, and I briefly commented that I was not very keen on the CPF Investment Scheme (CPFIS). That may change with Endowus coming into the picture...

Meaningful statistics on CPFIS are like hidden pieces of a treasure hunt on the CPF website, but some broad observations:
  • 4.0 million CPF members as of September 2019
  • 940,000 CPFIS-OA members as of Q3 2019 (and a further 297,000 CPFIS-SA members, which I won't be focusing on for the time being)
  • "Total cost of current holdings in CPFIS-OA" has been steadily dropping from 2008 to 2016, and the drop seems to have slowed down, but the graph by CPF is actually very misleading because the x-axis is inconsistent (originally by year, then by quarter). 
This means that less than 1 in 4 CPF members has opted in for the Investment Scheme for their OA, not even taking into consideration that some CPFIS-OA accounts may have been set up but were never used. Even assuming that all CPFIS-OA accounts are active, I find an average of $17,500 of "cost of current holdings" per account as of Q3 2019, which doesn't seem high and is significantly lower than ten years ago ($29,250 in 2009) or even five years ago ($22,000). In fact:
  • Out of the $142b in CPF members' OAs, only $16.6b (less than 12%) is invested as of Q3 2019, as compared to a whopping 37% in 2009 ($26.15b invested out of $70.6b) 
Clearly, popularity of the CPFIS-OA appears to be waning, and I think this can be attributed to three main reasons:
  1. Perception that 2.5% p.a. interest rate is "good enough". Relative to deposit account interest rates which have been nowhere close to even 1% for recent memory, 2.5% risk-free seems to be attractive, something which I do not deny.
  2. Hurdles in investing CPF monies. In addition to the hassle of setting up CPFIS itself, there are quite a number of fees involved, some of which are frankly absurd. For instance, DBS charges $2 per counter per quarter, subject to a minimum of $5. So that's instantly $20 of "service fees" per year even if you have just one counter, and it creeps up to $80 per year for someone attempting to diversify with 10 counters. I have no idea what "services" are actually offered.
  3. Fear. CPFIS may be subject to losses, and there is no guarantee of principal by CPF. Poor investment decisions could lead to significant losses, then panic, then withdrawal of funds (and realisation of those losses just as the market recovers...) For CPF members who continue to see both the OA and SA as their retirement vehicles, it is understandable to have a low degree of tolerance towards such losses, but if one adopts my suggested lens and sees the SA as the primary retirement vehicle, then sensible investing of CPF monies, in particular the OA, could yield positive returns while managing the impact of any volatility on retirement planning.

What does Endowus bring to the table?


In a nutshell, it is a low(er) cost method of investing CPF monies in a diversified unit trust portfolio, with a stock-bond allocation of the investor's choosing. Endowus operates under an MAS Financial Advisers license (rather than a Capital Markets Services license), so never directly handles clients' money. All funds and holdings are parked with UOB Kay Hian in the client's name. For CPFIS-OA members who use Endowus, the following three fees apply:
  • Access fee: Endowus selects best-in-class unit trusts for the various portfolios (e.g. 60/40 or 80/20) and also handles portfolio creation and rebalancing. For their services, they charge an access fee of 0.40% for assets under advice (~AUM).
  • Fund-level fee, which will also apply when buying a unit trust through other platforms (e.g. Fundsupermart), except that Endowus rebates trailer fees. Basically, out of the $X that a unit trust fund manager collects, a proportion is paid to the typical platform as a trailer fee (sort of like a commission), and the remainder, which we'll call $Y, is kept by the UT fund manager. Since Endowus promises to rebate 100% of trailer fees, the client effectively only pays a fund-level fee of $Y, instead of $X.
  • Agent bank charges, which apply to any sort of CPFIS arrangement. Basically, the "service fees" I mentioned earlier. One key advantage under Endowus is that because the client is holding one portfolio, the client only pays one quarterly service charge overall, even though he owns multiple unit trusts within that single portfolio. This is a clever workaround to reduce (although not totally eliminate) the somewhat frivolous fees charged by DBS, OCBC and UOB. 
For purposes of illustration, we can use the funds which are part of Endowus's CPF portfolio as of writing (end-Nov 2019):
  • Schroders Global Emerging Market Opportunities Fund
  • Natixis Harris Associates Global Equity Fund
  • Lion Global Infinity US 500 Stock Index
  • First State Dividend Advantage
  • Legg Mason Western Asset Global Bond Fund
  • Eastspring Singapore Select Bond Fund
  • United SGD Fund
Observation 1: Assuming that all 7 funds are available to retail investors, establishing a DIY 7-fund portfolio would incur 7x of the agent bank quarterly service fee, and any buying/selling of the funds (e.g. for rebalancing purposes) would incur agent bank transaction fees as well. Under Endowus, it will be counted as one portfolio, hence only incur a single quarterly service fee, and rebalancing-associated costs are not borne directly by the client but instead are covered by the separate 0.40% access fee.

Observation 2: Using the Schroders Global Emerging Market Opportunities Fund as an example - the annual expense ratio is around 1.66%-1.68%, which is what an investor would incur if owning the fund directly. But because Endowus rebates 100% of the trailer fees, this is brought down to 1.08% (source), and even after including the 0.40% access fee, the total of 1.48% is lower than the direct-purchase option.

Observation 3: Interestingly, observation 2 does not always apply - the Legg Mason Western Asset Global Bond Fund has an annual expense ratio of 0.87%, and through Endowus, the fund-level fee after trailer fee rebate is 0.57%. After including the access fee, the total of 0.97% is not as competitive as buying this fund directly. Endowus appears to have the comparative advantage in equity funds rather than bond funds, which is not surprising given that equity funds usually have higher fees to begin with (and hence can offer large trailer fees). Investors may wish to consider this when choosing their portfolio allocations.

Endowus is pretty upfront in acknowledging that the best way to preserve CPF capital is to stick to the risk-free 2.5% p.a. offered by the OA (assuming it never changes). Endowus is focusing on appealing to CPF investors looking for higher returns, by offering a fuss-free option supported by a non-intimidating user interface, and access to certain types of funds which may not be easily available to retail investors. Sure, the model does resemble that of a fund-of-funds setup, but I think the commitment to rebate 100% of trailer fees plus the very reasonable access fee of 0.40% make a very good value proposition.

Who will Endowus be suitable for?


I've initiated my account setup process and am waiting to explore the platform a bit more, but in the meantime a big question in my head is: what profile of CPF investor would Endowus be best-suited for?

My quick sensing is that young investors are unlikely to have much CPF OA monies available for investment, because a large majority of them may prefer to use CPF OA for housing needs, and still have to put up a $20,000 minimum balance before being able to invest the rest of their OA. Yet, these younger investors might be more receptive to what Endowus offers as an option to invest CPF monies. Older investors probably have larger CPF balances on average, yet may be a little harder to convince, because they might feel more reassured with "big bank" products, i.e. something offered by DBS, OCBC, or UOB, and may be willing to tolerate the higher fees as a trade-off for the reassurance they get investing through one of these better-known channels.

It'll be interesting to guess at what is Endowus's strategy here. While they also offer cash and SRS portfolios, their key comparative advantage at the moment is being able to offer a CPF portfolio, a feature which is currently unmatched by the competition. Is the investor base ready to come to the table with a new-found appetite for investing their CPF monies? How does one identify the "total addressable market" in this scenario? Will leveraging on the UOB Kay Hian tie-up help to reassure some would-be investors?  Time will tell, but certainly I think this is a step in the right direction. Having more options is always better than having few or none, and based on what I've heard, read, and observed, Endowus provides a very compelling option for investing CPF monies.

Endowus (and investing in general) is not about generating out-sized returns; leave that philosophy for a small, high-risk portfolio if you absolutely must, but don't let that active, risky portfolio form the backbone of your financial planning. Instead, build on what is often viewed as restriction - CPF monies are locked up and one cannot use them other than for housing (OA) and medical costs (MA) - and flip the perspective over to the positive, e.g. lock-in until age 55 means peace of mind, if done correctly from the start. In that context, Endowus potentially plays the role of a smartly-rebalanced investment/retirement platform suitable for CPF members, and is a first-mover in this untapped area.

[If you are keen to sign up for an account with Endowus, do consider using my referral link which enables both of us to have $10,000 of funds advised free for 6 months (a $20 value, to be precise). I receive no compensation from Endowus or any other party in writing this post.]

Post-edit: While there is a strong temptation to compare this to the DBS digiportfolio, I have consciously refrained from doing so since the latter is not a CPF-eligible product. I may touch on it in a separate post on cash-based investment options.

Friday, 15 November 2019

Back to business

Okay, so things have been dormant for a bit as I've had to focus on a couple of different things through the year and this blog went on the backburner. As I find myself with a a bit of time as we approach year-end, I thought it would be best to go ahead and jot some reflections. Penning down some thoughts is generally good for holding oneself accountable, validating past hypotheses, and also sharing my perspective with readers. So here goes...

The final earnings season of most US stocks is pretty much out of the way, and I had a short-lived period of being happy by taking profits off an earlier trade, which evaporated the very next day due to some disastrous results associated with a different counter.

PZZA - the oven gets warmer

The joy was provided by none other than Papa John's (PZZA), a pizza delivery chain fairly well-known in the US. I started a long position in May and was pleased to know that Starboard Value, an activist hedge fund, was looking to shake things up in the company (Starboard's claim to fame is its success turning around Olive Garden under Darden Restaurants - there is a rather dramatic deck of slides relating to this effort). Following some good results, my resting sell order cleared pre-market, and although the share price was to go up a little further over the course of the day, I was quite content with having locked in a 20+% return over a short period of around six months.

Frankly, my read is that the counter still has upside, but with trade uncertainties jumping from "nearly signed it!" to "nope, no deal!" every other week, I think it was good to take some money off the table for this consumer discretionary counter, since this sector is fairly exposed to economic sentiment (although this may depend on whether one views pizza as a normal good or an inferior good from a microeconomics point of view).

RLH - disaster!

The very next day, Red Lion Hotels Corporation (RLH) announced results which can only be described as a disaster, unfortunately wiping out my gains on PZZA and then some (quite a bit actually). It is almost unheard of for a share price to collapse by 50% except in the biotech/pharma sectors, or where there is fraud/corruption, but that's the scale of RLH's drop. I had been tracking the share price closely over the past couple of months and had already reduced my exposure slightly, but I never anticipated that the market would react so negatively to the results (and the CEO's departure ). I listened to the earnings call recording in an attempt to decipher what was going on.

Basically, there were some headwinds in the sector, and the results fell short of expectations. There were also quite a number of franchise agreement terminations, which is bad for the business as RLH moves towards an asset-light model. The remaining owned hotels have also taken quite a while to be sold, something which Vindico Capital issued a pointed shareholder's letter about, but already known prior to the earnings release.

Based on an earlier property count (as of 30 June 2019, from Red Lion's IR Website), it appears that the terminations are largely from the select-service category, from America's Best Value Inn and Canada's Best Value Inn, as well as from Knights Inn (which RLH acquired from Wyndham in 2018). Franchise terminations are part and parcel of the franchise business, and from the earnings call it didn't sound like the terminated properties were gravitating towards a specific competitor. I think RLH has some work to do (possibly streamlining the line-up of brands under its portfolio) for better operational efficiencies.

While I wish I had reduced my exposure further before the earnings call, there's nothing I can do about it now. As it stands, the significantly-reduced market cap of RLH could make it an M&A prospect given its portfolio of over a thousand properties representing nearly 80,000 hotel rooms. I'll have to watch this closely in the next couple of months, and hopefully the search for a replacement CEO ends in an outcome that is well-received by the market.

So what now

My portfolio YTD returns (blue line) took a sharp dive, and it doesn't look like I can come anywhere close to the stellar performance of the S&P (red line, 25% YTD) or even the world index (green line, 20% YTD). If not for the freak incident for RLH, I was tracking the world index pretty well. I take some comfort in having outperformed the Singapore index (purple line), and frankly, finishing the year with around 15% returns is not too shabby.


I've pared down some holdings and am looking towards a couple of anchors to drive returns over the next couple of months:

  • AMD, with close to 100% returns YTD, is poised to play a sort of David vs Goliath role against both Nvidia and Intel. Exciting times!
  • MU, perennial favourite of mine, and previously mentioned on this blog.
  • SQ, currently in the red but holding out for M&A potential - could Google or Apple swoop in?

I'm definitely overweight tech, but its the sector I'm most comfortable with. The long-drawn 787Max issue seems to be almost ignored by the market now, and it's interesting that airlines (even those which had large Max fleets like LUV) didn't get impacted too badly, but I'm sitting on the sidelines for now.

As a final point, and also to allude back to an oft-repeated mantra that investors should think long-term, I managed to cull this chart off my IB reports showing my historical performance (since I started using IB) versus the same four indexes mentioned above. Over here, I'm still ahead of the S&P (if only just, and largely due to pulling way ahead in 2018), so this is perhaps a #humblebrag. Nonetheless, I guess it was always better to have started earlier, and I'm glad I did!


Wednesday, 9 January 2019

Event: Stashaway Academy - Market Outlook 2019

A Wednesday evening talk at the newly-completed Frasers Tower on Cecil Street.

As I approached the ground floor lobby, the public announcement system played a pre-recorded message that the cause for a fire alarm (presumably triggered just a few moments before) was being investigated. For office workers at the end of their workday, there was no cause for panic, and an intermittent trickle exited the building, headed in various directions, no different from a typical workday routine.

Alas, a long line had formed at the security counter, with more than 20 people waiting to obtain a visitor pass. My guess was that most people were here for the same event. I joined the line. Progress was excruciatingly slow, but I still had full intention of attending this talk which I signed up for a while ago. My patience was worn gradually as ten minutes of waiting in line only yielded a few metres of forward movement in the human queue. One of the event organisers apologetically appealed to the participants for their patience, and his frustration was palpable from his comment to the effect that this was likely the first and last time they would use this space for any of their events.

Finally, there was some executive intervention - presumably some negotiations with building security that playing it by the book wasn't working out very well, and that something had to be done to remedy the unacceptable situation. We were allowed to enter the barrier gates leading to the lift landing area, where batches of us were then ushered into commodious high-ceiling elevators bound for The Executive Centre, a mixed-use space on the 17th floor of the building.

At risk of sounding slightly quixotic, it was perhaps an apt metaphor of an investment paradigm that would be pointedly relevant to the subsequent talk -- the fire alarm representing the constant barrage of media claiming to foretell the impending arrival of the next big recession and absolute financial apocalypse; the slow exodus of tired office workers being those who experience the misfortune and jadedness associated with selling low after buying high, figuratively coming back down to the ground (and literally as well, from their lofty offices high above).

The metaphor flows easily into the time spent waiting in line for security -- this represents the patience demanded of all who seek to be contrarian investors, the minority group who look to enter the building (investment opportunities) when everyone is being told by the fire alarm (the media) to leave. And when the time was right, the gates opened, the bulls came charging in (you got that), and all of us went up, up and up ... to level 17, where we were rewarded for our patience and willingness to stick to earlier convictions with a good sharing session in how to look at 2019 by Stashaway.

It serves little purpose for me to regurgitate what Freddy Lim, Stashway's co-founder and Chief Investment Officer, had to say, given that I've already painted the picture of the paradigm with the preceding paragraphs (double score for alliteration), but I'll leave you with three quick thoughts:

Unlike what you might be led to believe if you follow the media closely, we're not in a recession. Not yet, at least. I'm intending to follow the Conference Board's Leading Economic Index closely through 2019, and for the latest update the trend points towards continued positive growth, albeit much-curtailed from the earlier half of 2018 as well as much of 2017. Key takeaway: (my own, and not something mentioned by Freddy) Reading news to get an idea of what is going on is NOT the right way to do it; instead, read news with a strict goal of formulating your own opinion of what is taking place.

Understand your risk and your needs. This is super difficult to determine, since each of us have individual goals and financial situations. It's tedious, bothersome, and often under-appreciated (somewhat like going for a regular health check-up), but it's something all of us should do on a regular basis. Unlike a health check-up, it's difficult to find resources (people as well as information) to help you formulate an assessment of your risk and needs. Too many purported financial advisories are marketing and sales people in disguise, and good-quality financial advice is often not available or practical to those of us who don't have multi-million dollar portfolios to manage. My advice: read widely, start practicing (you could set up a paper trading account if you feel that helps you understand how investment things work in general), and draw lessons. Being clear of your goals will help you be cognizant of your risk appetite, and should guide your investment decisions.

The future is, ultimately, unpredictable. This was a point that Freddy brought across - that this evening's session was not about forecasting or predictions. Instead, he guided the audience towards a way of thinking, which I feel is quite difficult to hone in an age where there is constant media attention on just about everything. Freddy did have one slide showing the federal funds rate curve, from today out to around late 2021 (if I recall correctly). While the slide was used to illustrate a different point, it did strike me that we have nary a clue if the federal funds rate in 2021 was really going to be anywhere close to projection A or B or C or D. Heck, as at 9 January 2019, we hardly know how many rate hikes there are going to be in 2019 itself - the last we heard was probably two hikes, and then now we hear that there may be scope for a pause (or not?) Even in late 2018, there was uncertainty over whether there would/wouldn't be a final hike for the year. Come 2021, will it still be Jerome Powell as Fed Chair, Donald Trump as US President? Okay, we can be sure of one thing: President Xi in China, but other than that, really everything is anyone's guess, and everyone can guess can anything.

So it's much more useful to spend one's finite mental energies developing a way of thinking, than developing fine-grained predictions. When I picture that federal funds rate curve, the only part of the curve that really matters to me is the next 12 months or so. Beginning from the second half of this subset (i.e. around 6 months out), the line widens out into a triangular-shaped area, representing a cone of possibilities. The future is likely to lie somewhere within this cone, but as we go further (two or three years from now), that cone funnels out wider and wider, covering an increasingly larger vertical span of the entire graph, such that by the end of three years, the cone is so wide that it's practically useless for any kind of point-precision projections (which is precisely the point - oh, some word play there), but it's intuitively useful to illustrate the instructive uncertainty surrounding any kind of longer time horizon projection.

And I'll leave you with these thoughts for now, cheers and out!

Tuesday, 1 January 2019

Right to the end

You know how they say, the game ain't over till the fat lady sings?

The previous post on 20 December 2018 could be a good example of that.

Portfolio sank into the red (!) almost right after the post, and was almost 6% down for the year, until a brief recovery in the last moments - literally between Christmas and New Year's Eve, pushed it back up into the green.

Whew!

Thursday, 20 December 2018

Back where it begun

As 2018 wraps, it's time to take a look back on the year.



The chart says it all - I'm back to where I started the year. Q4 was basically a quarter of trauma, and I'm fortunate to have kept north of the S&P500, albeit slightly, in terms of my USD-denominated investments.

A couple of lessons -

Don't be greedy. Yeah, we all know that - in theory. I watched in glee as RLH climbed up far beyond my expectations, and before I knew it, it was back down at what could be considered fair/slightly discounted valuations. I am looking at a big patch of red.

Some things might not make sense - for the time being. Back on 21 May, I published a post about MU (Looking for value - case study on Micron). Guess what? That post was just about a week shy of MU's peak at $64.66. While I am lucky not to have entered at the peak, MU is now also another position that's deeply in the red. The recent weak forward guidance has not helped the cause, and makes me wonder whether the market knew beforehand that there would be weakness in NAND/DRAM demand and progressively began to price it in. As of today, the stock trades at a ridiculous TTM P/E of less than 3, but it's the future that's going to bring returns, not the past. I still like MU because of its strong cash position and the in-progress $10b buyback, but the forward guidance cannot be ignored. The company is not trimming $1.25b in capex frivolously, and must foresee market challenges ahead to be doing so. I believe there is long-term upside, but this will require patience and in the meantime I'll look for opportunities to bring down my cost basis.


Options aren't easy. I don't think I made positive returns on a single option trade this year, but this is a completely new beast for me. Options have their usefulness - buying $34 MU puts just before the earnings release would have cushioned the blow a fair bit, but I don't have enough experience to use them to my advantage yet.

With the recent volatility, it is tempting to exit one's positions and sit out the next couple of months (especially considering the Jan 2019 SSB issue will get you around 2% p.a. for the first year), but that may be an overreaction. While 2018 will fall shy of my desired returns, I take consolation in having stayed ahead of the S&P500, and will bring the lessons above into 2019.

In the meantime, I'm trying to keep a pulse on the M&A prospects, having narrowly missed on Panera Bread in 2017 and then Sodastream in 2018. Having not been able to plan a trip to the US this year (the first calendar year I've not stepped on US soil since I started university as a freshman!), my ability to get a pulse on things is severely diminished, so this is a lot more difficult than I would prefer.

On the home front, I continue to stare at lacklustre portfolio performance across all SGD-denominated holdings (seriously, I would be better off if I had put my money in SSBs) but will be focusing on finding good entry points for selected REITs in 2019. I've hitherto tried to apply my US stock thesis onto SGX stocks, to little success. In 2019, I'll shift towards a more dividend-driven approach for SGD-denominated holdings and hopefully be able to pare down on some of the big drags on my portfolio - I'm looking at you, S59.SI.

Till the next time, cheers and out.